Psyche and Soma is a multi-disciplinary exploration of the conceptions of the human soul or mind and body, through the course of more than two thousand years of Western history. Thirteen specially commissioned chapters, each written by a recogized expert, discuss figures such as the physicians Hippocrates, Galen, Stahl, and Cabanis; theologians St Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas; and philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes, Leibniz, and La Mettrie. The chapters explore in chronlogical sequence the views of these writers on (...) such questions as the soul's immortality, the control it exerts over the body, how mental disturbances arise out of bodily imbalances, and the roles of the priest and the physician in promoting spiritual and mental health. Psyche and Soma will be a key point of reference and a rich source of illumination in this central area of human inquiry. (shrink)

Qu’elle soit ingrate ou réussie, la vieillesse soulève des questions incontournables : celles de la mort et de la souffrance, de la responsabilité et de la vulnérabilité. Du silence et de la parole aussi. Être vulnérable, c’est être fragile, friable ; c’est avoir besoin de son prochain. La vulnérabilité est liée, notamment, à la maladie, au grand âge, à la dépendance ou au fardeau de l’aide. Or, les personnes aidées et aidantes sont surtout des femmes. Il y a les femmes (...) du grand âge et les femmes de tous les âges, qui exécutent à leurs côtés, bénévolement, un travail domestique de santé. Faisons apparaître les obstacles au respect des droits et au pouvoir d’agir de ce « couple vulnérable » aidant-aidé, dans une perspective critique et féministe du droit et de l’éthique. Brisons le silence. (shrink)

L’idée de ce numéro nous est venue à l’occasion d’une conférence de Karen Neander donnée à l’Université de Heidelberg en janvier 20071. Aujourd’hui professeur à l’Université de Duke, aux États-Unis, Karen Neander est l’auteur de travaux importants en philosophie de la biologie. À l’idée d’une traduction de son texte en français, alors qu’il est encore inédit dans..

La théorie étiologique définit les fonctions biologiques en faisant référence à l'action passée de la sélection naturelle. Elle peut ainsi permettre de définir les pathologies comme des dysfonctionnements : il y a pathologie lorsqu'un composant x de l'organisme ne fait plus ce qu'il est censé faire et qui a conduit à le retenir dans le passé de l'histoire évolutive. On peut distinguer trois problèmes qui attendent les partisans de cette solution. Le premier est celui de la conciliation entre deux visées (...) différentes : la théorie de l'évolution peut-elle à la fois contribuer à l'explication du fait récurrent de la maladie (ce que vise une « médecine darwinienne ») et permettre une démarcation entre normal et pathologique ? Le second problème est celui des exceptions : en certains cas, une incapacité acquise a bien valeur de pathologie, mais la présence de la capacité correspondante ne s'explique pas par la sélection, ce qui ôte à la proposition initiale son caractère de nécessité conceptuelle. Enfin, la réalisation d'un trait peut être à la fois atypique et adaptative, ce qui fragilise la notion de normalité biologique impliquée par la théorie étiologique. Ces problèmes sont sérieux et l'article examine pour conclure si un autre concept de fonction, le concept systémique, ne pourrait pas mieux convenir moyennant quelques ajustements, à la philosophie de la médecine. Etiological theory defines biological functions in reference to the past action of natural selection. Accordingly, it may define pathological states as dysfunctional states : component x being in a pathological state would mean x no longer does what it is still supposed to do, that is, what it has been designed to do in past evolutionary history. There are three problems with this solution. First, it may prove difficult to reconcile the evolutionary explanation of the recurring fact of disease (the purpose of a « Darwinian medicine ») and the suggested demarcation between the normal and the pathological. Second, we may think of cases where a certain capacity is impaired, this impairment being clearly a pathology, and where, nonetheless, the explanation of why the corresponding capacity is there is by no means selective. This weakens the initial proposition because it thereby loses its alleged conceptual necessity. Thirdly, a biological feature may be expressed in a way that is both atypical and adaptive, i.e. a challenge to the idea of biological normality involved in etiological theory. These seem to be quite serious problems and one may ask if another concept of function, the systemic concept with a number of adjustments, would not be better suited to the ends of the philosophy of medicine. (shrink)

La seule alternative au dualisme est-elle la thèse de l'identité entre états mentaux et états cérébraux? Non, si on en croit Alva Noë (Out of our Heads, 2009) et W. Teed Rockwell (Neither Brain nor Ghost, 2005). Privilégiant les interactions entre cerveau, corps et environnement, ils entendent proposer une critique des fondements des neurosciences cognitives. Cependant, ni la conception énactiviste de Noë, ni la conception néopragmatiste de Rockwell n'ont les implications bouleversantes qu'elles prétendent avoir. Le conflit apparent des théories semble (...) en outre se ramener à des différences de perspective sur la cognition, l'esprit et la conscience. Is the claim that mental states and brain states are identical the only alternative to Cartesian dualism? Alva Noë and W. Teed Rockwell both challenge this view and elaborate a critique of the principles of cognitive neuroscience that draws on an analysis of the interactions between brain, body and the external environment. However, neither Noë's enactivist view, nor Rockwell's pragmatic conception do have the groundbreaking implications they are supposed to have. Moreover, the alleged conflict between these rival conceptions seems to be reducible to differences of perspective on cognition, mind and consciousness. (shrink)

Tome I. Quatre essais sur les régimes conceptuels -- Tome 2. Quatre essais sur la connaissance de l'Humain.

Cet essai a été présenté à l’atelier sur La démocratie de l’espace et l’espace de la démocratie, qui a eu lieu à Newcastle, en Angleterre, le 11 janvier 2008. Une version antérieure a été présentée à l’Université de Tokyo le 13 novembre 2007. Il sera publié en néerlandais, traduit par Freek Jansens, sous le titre “het plannen van ruimtes van (on)mogelijkheid” dans une collection éditée par Maarten Hajer et Jantine Grijzen sur les questions de politique contemporaine. Il a été traduit (...) de l’anglais par Martin Blanchard et révisé par Daniel Weinstock. (shrink)

Parmi les scénarios proposés par les transhumanistes qui impliquent la survie des personnes au-delà de leur existence biologique, le téléchargement de l’esprit peut être considéré comme le moins extravagant. Dans cet article, j’établis une filiation entre la tradition philosophique des expériences de pensée dérivée de la réflexion de Locke sur l’identité personnelle et la perspective du téléchargement. Cette filiation est particulièrement importante lorsque nous discutons de ce que pourraient être des critères de succès dans un tel contexte et de ce (...) qui est requis par un véritable transfert dans ce type de cas. La défense du téléchargement de l’esprit proposée par Kenneth Hayworth est analysée dans sa relation aux données scientifiques sur lesquelles repose sa justification. Je donne des raisons de douter du bien-fondé de son optimisme en évoquant la recherche en connectomique et en simulation du cerveau. (shrink)

Locke distingue : la connaissance intuitive, la connaissance rationnelle et la connaissance sensitive. C'est par celle-ci que nous accédons à la connaissance des « autres choses ». Or on peut se demander comment le sens peut être à la fois juge et témoin. En fait, pour Locke, notre connaissance des choses hors de nous a une « fiabilité effective », mais ce n'en est pas une connaissance parfaite, laquelle nous est inaccessible. Locke distinguishes : intuitive knowledge, rational knowledge, and sensitive (...) knowledge. It is through the latter that we reach the knowledge of « other things ». Now, one may wonder how can sense be both at the same time judge and witness. In fact, according to Locke, our knowledge of things outside ourselves bears some « effective reliability » but it is not necessarily a true knowledge, which is indeed unattainable. (shrink)

Parler de l'homme connaissant, c'est poser des questions, notamment : une perspective scientifique unifiée sur l'esprit ("cognitivisme") est-elle légitime? En quoi l'intuition et la construction de concepts peuvent-elles rendre compte des mathématiques, mais aussi, analogiquement, de l'art et de la langue? Quel rapport y a-t-il entre la connaissance et les normativités morale et juridique? Les présents essais – "L'esprit pensé", "Ce que nous devons à Augustin", "L'intuition et après", "La morale et la fable" – abordent ces questions fondatrices à partir (...) d'un point de vue critique sur les différents régimes de nos connaissances. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill examine dans le dernier des Trois Essais sur la religion l’argument du Dessein. Ce faisant, il l’évalue selon les normes épistémiques définies dans le Système de logique en dressant un parallèle avec l’hypothèse présentée par Darwin dans L’Origine des espèces. Pour comprendre le verdict nuancé rendu par Mill, il faut faire intervenir trois niveaux d’analyse : la relation entre méthode inductive et méthode hypothétique (théorie de la connaissance), le choix du phénoménalisme qui limite l’engagement naturaliste (métaphysique), la (...) question de l’espoir raisonnable (philosophie morale). La philosophie de la religion engage ainsi l’unité de la philosophie de Mill. (shrink)

Dans L'animal, l'homme, la fonction symbolique , Raymond Ruyer cherchait à caractériser la spécificité de l'homme à l'intérieur du monde biologique et il en distinguait trois traits constitutifs : le rôle modifié du cerveau, la transmission ou « hérédité » culturelle, la dimension symbolique du langage. Sa thèse était qu'il faut chercher dans le maniement des symboles ce qui rend possible les diverses manifestations de la culture, et qu'en vertu de cette origine commune, ces manifestations doivent être considérées comme indissociables. (...) Mais, il y a chez Ruyer, une troisième voie entre émergence et réduction. Il a, en ce qui concerne les symboles, une dette à l'égard de Cassirer et surtout de Susanne Langer. Enfin les acquis en éthologie cognitive et les recherches contemporaines sur l'évolution de la faculté du langage permettent d'apprécier avec quelque scepticisme la position de Ruyer. In Vanimal, Vhomme, la fonction symbolique , Raymond Ruyer tried to define the specificity of man within the biological world, distinguishing three characteristic features: the modified role of the brain, cultural transmission or "heredity", the symbolic dimension of language. He argued that one had to consider the manipulation of symbols as what makes possible the manifestations of culture, and that, because of their common origin, these manifestations should be held to be intricately linked. This paper focuses on the alternative to emergence and reduction that Ruyer intends to define, and elaborates, with respect to symbols, his debt towards Ernst Cassirer and, most notably, Susanne K. Langer. Finally, it provides a skeptical examination of Ruyer's position, drawing on the results of cognitive ethology and on contemporary research on the evolution of the linguistic faculty. (shrink)

Le motif du langage visuel, qui traverse l'ensemble de l'oeuvre de Berkeley, n'est pas seulement le noyau de sa philosophie de la perception. Il est aussi le préréquisit d'une preuve originale de l'existence de Dieu, une évaluation spécifique de la nature de l'expérience commune et de la portée de l'explication scientifique, et il a des conséquences singulières quant à la doctrine de la création du monde. La première conclusion de l'article est qu'en dépit du rejet berkeleyen du mécanisme, on peut (...) avec raison comparer sa pensée avec la conception cybernétique des machines à information; le langage visuel est, dans une certaine mesure, la source d'un réseau global de communication. Mais rien n'est plus important pour Berkeley que la question de la mort, et c'est pourquoi il doit rejeter toute forme d'objectivisme. L'immatérialiste est celui qui affirme que le monde ne peut pas survivre à son propre anéantissement sans l'aide d'un autre esprit, dont la vision est la substance même de toute chose. The design of visual language, which pervades the entire work of Berkeley, is not only the core of his philosophy of perception. It is also the prerequisite of an original proof of God's existence, a specific understanding of both the nature of common experience and the scope of scientific explanation, and it involves unusual consequences upon the doctrine of the creation of the world. The first conclusion of the paper is that, despite Berkeley's rejection of mechanicism, we have a right to confront his views with the cybernetic perspective on information processing machines : visual language is, to a certain extent, the source of a global communication network. But there is nothing more important to Berkeley than the topical question of death, and this is why he is compelled to rejecting whatever kind of objectivism. The immaterialist is he who acknowledges that the world cannot survive his own annihilation without the help of another spirit, whose vision is the very substance of all things. (shrink)

La liste des qualités inclut chez Locke une troisième espèce, celle de qualités qu'on attribue aux corps du fait de leur effet perceptible sur des corps tiers. De telles qualités pourraient être analysées comme des propriétés dispositionnelles. Elles tirent leur importance de ceci que leur concept oblige à reconsidérer la question des rapports entre entités et relations. Comme le montre une science comme la chimie, ce sont souvent les relations qui nous renseignent le mieux sur l'identité des agents naturels. De (...) plus si nous suivons la lecture que Whitehead fait de Locke, et que nous considérons les objets comme recevant du dehors leurs déterminations fondamentales, nous pouvons soutenir que les relations sont ce qui détermine l'identité des « entités actuelles ». The list of qualities includes in Locke's thought a third kind, that of qualities attributed to physical entities because of their perceptible effect upon bodies other than ours. Such qualities could be analysed as dispositional properties. Their importance comes from the fact that their very concept leads to a reappraisal of the respective role of substances and relations. As is shown by a science like chemistry, relations are often our best source of knowledge about the specific nature of physical agents. Moreover, if we follow Whitehead's reading of Locke, and if we consider objects as receiving from the outside their main determinations, we can go as far as to say that relations are what determines the identity of « actual entities ». (shrink)

L'une des tâches de la philosophie de la biologie contemporaine consiste à rechercher les conditions d'un usage des énoncés fonctionnels dont serait éliminée toute trace de causalité inversée ou d'interprétation mentaliste. Parmi les spécifications de l'idée d'un lien entre fonction et adaptation, la théorie de Millikan est remarquable en ceci qu'elle rend compte du divorce possible entre attribution légitime d'une fonction et absence de l'activité fonctionnelle correspondante, comme dans les cas de maladie ou d'atrophie congénitale. On peut montrer que la (...) distinction essentielle entre causes et moyens peut être comprise à partir d'une référence à l'opposition entre explication en termes de développement et explication en termes de sélection, à condition de reconnoître toute la portée de cette dernière. One aim of contemporary philosophy of biology is to secure a use of functional statements in which there would be no implication of reversed causation or anthropomorphic interpretation. Among the recent alternatives, Millikan's theory is most notable for the way it allows to explain the possible divorce between legitimate functional ascriptions and lack of corresponding functional activity, as in disease or congenital atrophy cases. It is argued that the crucial distinction between causes and means can be better understood with a reference to the contrast between developmental and selectional explanations. (shrink)

L'ergographe d'Angelo Mosso est caractérisé comme objectivation du travail musculaire par la méthode graphique, mais aussi comme indice d'une compréhension du corps comme machine, et comme élément d'un systéme où la connaissance doit déterminer l'usage de la force de travail. Les recherches qui sont issues de l'œuvre de Mosso sont analysées dans cet article comme une reconnaissance des exigences normatives du corps en action — menant à une appréciation nouvelle, en particulier, de la signification de la fatigue — et non (...) comme un projet d'assujettissement de l'homme au travail. Les difficultés propres aujourd'hui à toute mesure du travail soulignent rétrospectivement la portée critique du mouvement ergographique. Mosso's ergograph is defined as a tool which made a tracing of the mechanical work of the muscles available ; as a symptom of a mechanistic conception of the human body, but also as part of a system where knowledge has to determine the social use of labour power. Research going beyond Mosso's pioneering work is analyzed in this paper as an acknowledgement of the normative demands of the body in action — leading, in particular, to a reappraisal of the meaning of physical fatigue, rather than as an attempt to further enslave man to his work. In retrospect, the difficulties currently inherent to any attempt at work measurement underline the critical implications of ergography. (shrink)

Dans L'animal, l'homme, la fonction symbolique, Raymond Ruyer cherchait à caractériser la spécificité de l'homme à l'intérieur du monde biologique et il en distinguait trois traits constitutifs : le rôle modifié du cerveau, la transmission ou « hérédité » culturelle, la dimension symbolique du langage. Sa thèse était qu'il faut chercher dans le maniement des symboles ce qui rend possible les diverses manifestations de la culture, et qu'en vertu de cette origine commune, ces manifestations doivent être considérées comme indissociables. Mais, (...) il y a chez Ruyer, une troisième voie entre émergence et réduction. Il a, en ce qui concerne les symboles, une dette à l'égard de Cassirer et surtout de Susanne Langer. Enfin les acquis en éthologie cognitive et les recherches contemporaines sur l'évolution de la faculté du langage permettent d'apprécier avec quelque scepticisme la position de Ruyer. In Vanimal, Vhomme, la fonction symbolique, Raymond Ruyer tried to define the specificity of man within the biological world, distinguishing three characteristic features: the modified role of the brain, cultural transmission or "heredity", the symbolic dimension of language. He argued that one had to consider the manipulation of symbols as what makes possible the manifestations of culture, and that, because of their common origin, these manifestations should be held to be intricately linked. This paper focuses on the alternative to emergence and reduction that Ruyer intends to define, and elaborates, with respect to symbols, his debt towards Ernst Cassirer and, most notably, Susanne K. Langer. Finally, it provides a skeptical examination of Ruyer's position, drawing on the results of cognitive ethology and on contemporary research on the evolution of the linguistic faculty. (shrink)

Humanity is made of technical objects. Despite of this fact, technique is not considered as a cultural matter especially in engineering schools where it should be taught. As teachers and searchers at the INSA Lyon, we have experienced the way and the difficulties to develop this technical culture.

Forests play fundamental roles in the Earth’s ecosystems. With the great capability of carbon sequestration, tropical forests are expected to contribute substantially to reducing the CO2 in Earth’s atmosphere. However, global tropical forest areas have declined drastically over the last few decades due to pressures from socio-economic development pursuit. The current essay aims to demonstrate the ongoing global deforestation crisis and its underlying drivers and discuss the vital roles of tropical forests in the socio-economic development in the face of (...) climate change when developed countries start to tighten the carbon emission control regulations (e.g., European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism). It suggests why developing countries in tropical regions, particularly Vietnam, should not sacrifice forests for short- and medium-term socio-economic goals but capitalize on them to leverage long-term development. Moreover, evidence of Vietnamese political leaders’ commitment to forest protection and sustainable development is also provided. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 34.2 (2006) 3-13 [Access article in PDF] Biographical Illusion and Methodological Reality Leland De La Durantaye Pierre Bourdieu. Esquisse Pour Une Auto-Analyse. Paris: Raisons d'Agir, 2004. 1 Like his student and friend Nietzsche, Jacob Burckhardt often stressed the necessity for a scholar to work in solitude. Like Nietzsche, he also possessed a gift for acidic analogy and likened the world of academia to a group of dogs sniffing (...) one another.Few observers of the academic interactions of his time had such sharp senses as Pierre Bourdieu, and few have been as torn between solitary reflection and communal exchange. Trained by France's most elite academic institutions (such as the celebrated Parisian lycée Louis-le-Grand and the even more celebrated École Normale Supérieure), Bourdieu was grateful for the opportunities that this training afforded him. And he felt that this gratitude could best be repaid by submitting those elite academic institutions and their insular world to an unsparing critique, to unveiling the distance that separated their stated ideals from their real effects.Like Bergson and Jaurès, like Sartre and Aron, like Foucault and Derrida, Bourdieu studied that which was most difficult and most prestigious where it was most difficult and prestigious: philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure. Like those famous fellow alumni, he was a brilliant student, and like them, he longed to distinguish his personal vision from those around him. This led him to do something surprising, something that, despite their separate and significant dissatisfactions with the philosophy of their day, neither Bergson nor Sartre, neither Foucault nor Derrida ever did: he abandoned philosophy. He left what he saw as the intellectual royal road for the most pedestrian of paths—that of sociology.As he often reminded his readers, sociology was in a sorry state when he entered it. Both in academic appraisal and the popular imagination, it was considered dry and provincial. It was thought to have no true intellectual adventure in it—nothing of the ethnologist tramping through the rain forests of the Amazon, nothing of the lone philosopher working through the night on an opus to end metaphysics. It was laborious and abstract; it dealt in statistical generalities. Bourdieu repeatedly described sociology as "the pariah of disciplines."1 He had, however, a special mission for it in mind. [End Page 3]In Bourdieu's posthumous memoir Esquisse pour une auto-analyse, published in February 2004—two years after his death—by the small publishing house he helped found, Raisons d'Agir, he notes how, "a bit as a joke," he had often defined himself as "the leader of a liberation movement aiming to free the social sciences from philosophy's imperialism" [94].2 From early on in his career, he had wished to revolt against the "empire of the total philosopher"—an empire reigned over by, more than any other, Jean-Paul Sartre [cf. 25].3 Looking back upon this decisive period of his development, Bourdieu goes so far as to state that the shaping of his identity was done "against everything which the Sartrian enterprise represented for me" [37]. In historical accounts, Sartre is often given as counterfigure his friend and fellow normalien Raymond Aron. In his Esquisse, Bourdieu proposes a different, and less conventional, counterfigure for the imperial philosopher: the brilliant Austrian satirist and cultural critic Karl Kraus. Bourdieu notes the particular affection he had always felt for Kraus and attributes it to the latter's singular capacity for "critical reflectivenesss" [37]. Subtly, and appropriately, Bourdieu follows this remark with something that occurs nowhere else in his memoir: an epigram (the composing of which Kraus excelled in). Bourdieu writes: "there are a great many intellectuals who question the world, but there are very few intellectuals who question the intellectual world" [37]. The remark could not more compactly and precisely reflect what Bourdieu had aspired all his life to do: to excel in the art and science of questioning the intellectual world. 2 Leo Spitzer liked to cite Friedrich Gundolf's dictum "Methode ist Erlebnis" (method is lived experience). Nearing the end of his career... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:418 Feminist Studies 43, no. 2. © 2017 by the estate of tatiana de la tierra. Ode to Unsavory Lesbians i love an ugly lesbian one who walks with a limp talks with a lisp leaves her dentures out overnight by the bathroom sink wears polyester pants and men’s cologne, the cheap kind has a beard so long she steps on it sprouts warts on her toes, all twelve (...) of them carries a spittoon in her breast pocket chortles at church people i dream of a lesbian who’s always broke she doesn’t own a car, walks streets barefoot, near and far washes all her clothes by hand steals from walmart scams the business-suited man lights matches on her wooden leg barbeques freshly plucked birds on her shopping cart seasons them with salt, that’s all licks her fingers in the moonlight i crave a lesbian who’s fat and fleshy so big she can’t fit through the door at starbucks and they set up an outdoor café just for her so fat she wears bangles on her fingers her belly is a boom box her stretch marks are hieroglyphic etchings she’s so heavy, tectonic plates shift beneath her feet so huge, lake erie is her bathtub tatiana de la tierra tatiana de la tierra   419 i lust after an unsavory lesbian she blows away my lackluster day leads me in a lambada, lights lantern between my legs lays my head down on lace pillows humps me like a lamppost lacerates me with leather lust lacquers my body with blue latex paint logs the forest for prime wood builds me lakeside throne sets me there and worships me —goddess in blue— lines my path with lady slippers ravishes me with sex words pets me like a little lamb wins me by a landslide To My Kidneys i had no inkling of your existence those summers when i swam in waters at the turkey point nuclear power plant a mile from home was proud of the organic salad tomatoes and the steaming peppermint tea that came from backyard garden a block from the rex chemicals plant life at 29822 SW 147th avenue in leisure city was anything but leisurely 420 tatiana de la tierra it was all screaming and fighting and cursing hijueputa this and hijueputa that poverty pissed me off i drank too much high fructose corn syrup not enough purified water snorted cocaine smoked dope lived all toughed out while you worked silently on my behalf filtering purifying regulating i was an angry girl but i blew up no buildings killed no one i was all hot air exploding inside letting carnage settle harden at twenty-nine something was wrong the damage was done your tubules were atrophying glomeruli were dead and dying you were inflamed and irate i had twenty-four grams of protein in the urine all swollen and freakishly feverish pouring my fluids into vials and beakers tried to recollect every sun burn those little red dots on my childhood skin tatiana de la tierra   421 i was a medical mystery for months until the day doctors made a diagnosis: lupus-mediated membranous glomerulonephritis now, eighteen years later you’re all i’ve got my future is in the capillaries of your glomeruli i’ve taken pills done prayers of all kinds even injected myself with german baby’s umbilical cord to keep you going yet you falter healers put the blame on all kinds of things deep-seated fears petrochemicals lead cadmium karma white flour self-hatred seriousness we’re in this together, you and i let’s go get sunshine drink green tea grow tall and strong wade in waters up to our knees like the cypress in the florida swamps gracing riverbanks and wetlands roots filtering flowing waters branches stretching to the skies with their durable and eternal woods 422 tatiana de la tierra Topanga Canyon i had forgotten trees how they claim earth and sky a herd of elephants standing in place reaching up with their trunks carrying torches of green leaves that breathe after death crushed at my feet trees splayed out like spent lovers legs open... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 33.2 (2005) 3-9 [Access article in PDF] The Suspended Substantive On Animals and Men in Giorgio Agamben's The Open Leland de la Durantaye Giorgio Agamben. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004. [O] Trans. of L'aperto: L'uomo e l'animale. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002. [A] With a title as enigmatic as The Open, the reader might well wonder, "the open what?" Is the title's (...) adjective to stand alone? Does it need no substantive to support it? This unfamiliar title is not what one might first guess—it is not an awkward translation from the work's original title. No substantive follows in the original, and none is meant to. The idea that gives Agamben's book its title is that of an openness which is unconditioned—and perhaps unconditional, an openness which is unspecified—and perhaps unspecifiable.If the answer to the question "the open what?" can be answered with no substantive, might we ask in what this opening occurs? Between what more substantive things has an indefinable space been opened? The first answer to the question can be found in the work's subtitle—Man and Animal. The open space in question is that which separates and distinguishes man from animal. Philosophers, anthropologists, social scientists, zoologists, chemists, taxonomists—and many others—have had no small difficulty in agreeing upon the matter.Philosophers have traditionally had a low opinion of animals [cf. de Fontenay]. Descartes had especially little respect for the minds of animals and influentially classified them as automata mechanica. As Agamben notes, the great naturalist and taxonomist Linnaeus responded to this assertion with the laconic rejoinder: "Descartes obviously never saw an ape" [cf. O 23/A 30; translation modified]. Philosophers have been more eager than taxonomists to put distance between themselves and the animals—and for this reason have been particularly interested in studying what separates man from animal. The last great philosophical attempt in this regard is that of Martin Heidegger. Despite his preference for the primordial, his openness to the woods and the wilderness, his opinion of animals' faculties was not much higher than that of Descartes. In his view, animals live in an environment in which they are receptive to various stimuli, but where they have nothing approximating what we call a "world"—animals are, as he claims, "poor in world" (weltarm)—or even "without world" (weltlos). They live in such intense and incessant proximity to their environment and its stimuli that they do not see the existential forest for the environmental trees. They can never take a step away from the immediacy of their perception and for this reason cannot be said to possess a "world" in the sense that man, in Heidegger's view, does.As mentioned above, the title The Open is, for all its strangeness, not the result of [End Page 3] an awkward translation from Agamben's Italian. Its strangeness stems, nevertheless, in large part from a translation. Or, to be more precise, from two translations. The first of these is from the German. The German in question is a special one—that of the profoundly idiosyncratic technical vocabulary that Heidegger fashioned for his philosophical purposes. For Heidegger, "the open" is something literally fundamental which lay at the heart of his thought. "The open" is the space revealed to us in the moment when the world we live in, which because of our many tasks and travails we tend to take no distance from (like animals with their stimuli), opens out onto something larger. This moment of distancing ourselves from our everyday concern with means and ends, with stimuli and response, is what gives us not just an environment, but a "world." "The open" is what we find ourselves in when the bustle and haste of our environment recedes and we see that environment in all its strangeness and immensity—as a "world," greater and less graspable than our restricted and finite representations. This experience of "the open" is, for Heidegger, what makes us human, and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:418 Feminist Studies 43, no. 2. © 2017 by the estate of tatiana de la tierra. Ode to Unsavory Lesbians i love an ugly lesbian one who walks with a limp talks with a lisp leaves her dentures out overnight by the bathroom sink wears polyester pants and men’s cologne, the cheap kind has a beard so long she steps on it sprouts warts on her toes, all twelve (...) of them carries a spittoon in her breast pocket chortles at church people i dream of a lesbian who’s always broke she doesn’t own a car, walks streets barefoot, near and far washes all her clothes by hand steals from walmart scams the business-suited man lights matches on her wooden leg barbeques freshly plucked birds on her shopping cart seasons them with salt, that’s all licks her fingers in the moonlight i crave a lesbian who’s fat and fleshy so big she can’t fit through the door at starbucks and they set up an outdoor café just for her so fat she wears bangles on her fingers her belly is a boom box her stretch marks are hieroglyphic etchings she’s so heavy, tectonic plates shift beneath her feet so huge, lake erie is her bathtub tatiana de la tierra tatiana de la tierra   419 i lust after an unsavory lesbian she blows away my lackluster day leads me in a lambada, lights lantern between my legs lays my head down on lace pillows humps me like a lamppost lacerates me with leather lust lacquers my body with blue latex paint logs the forest for prime wood builds me lakeside throne sets me there and worships me —goddess in blue— lines my path with lady slippers ravishes me with sex words pets me like a little lamb wins me by a landslide To My Kidneys i had no inkling of your existence those summers when i swam in waters at the turkey point nuclear power plant a mile from home was proud of the organic salad tomatoes and the steaming peppermint tea that came from backyard garden a block from the rex chemicals plant life at 29822 SW 147th avenue in leisure city was anything but leisurely 420 tatiana de la tierra it was all screaming and fighting and cursing hijueputa this and hijueputa that poverty pissed me off i drank too much high fructose corn syrup not enough purified water snorted cocaine smoked dope lived all toughed out while you worked silently on my behalf filtering purifying regulating i was an angry girl but i blew up no buildings killed no one i was all hot air exploding inside letting carnage settle harden at twenty-nine something was wrong the damage was done your tubules were atrophying glomeruli were dead and dying you were inflamed and irate i had twenty-four grams of protein in the urine all swollen and freakishly feverish pouring my fluids into vials and beakers tried to recollect every sun burn those little red dots on my childhood skin tatiana de la tierra   421 i was a medical mystery for months until the day doctors made a diagnosis: lupus-mediated membranous glomerulonephritis now, eighteen years later you’re all i’ve got my future is in the capillaries of your glomeruli i’ve taken pills done prayers of all kinds even injected myself with german baby’s umbilical cord to keep you going yet you falter healers put the blame on all kinds of things deep-seated fears petrochemicals lead cadmium karma white flour self-hatred seriousness we’re in this together, you and i let’s go get sunshine drink green tea grow tall and strong wade in waters up to our knees like the cypress in the florida swamps gracing riverbanks and wetlands roots filtering flowing waters branches stretching to the skies with their durable and eternal woods 422 tatiana de la tierra Topanga Canyon i had forgotten trees how they claim earth and sky a herd of elephants standing in place reaching up with their trunks carrying torches of green leaves that breathe after death crushed at my feet trees splayed out like spent lovers legs open... (shrink)